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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
R I C H A R D W. M I L L E R , 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
S H E R Y L R A E ( M I L L E R ) 
M A R T I C O R E N A , ' 
Defendant, ( 
and 
SERGIO A. MARTICORENA, ' 
Third-Party Defendant, 
Appellant. 




The Third-Party Defendant and Appellant, 
SERGIO A. MARTICORENA, petitions this Hon-
orable Court for rehearing in the above-entitled case 
pursuant to Rule 76(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure for the following reasons: 
1. The trial court was without jurisdiction at the 
time of the hearing and its order modifying the Divorce 
Decree is a nullity. 
1 
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2. In its opinion the Supreme Court did not con-
sider the physical circumstances and medical evidence 
that was absolutely reliable and determinative of 
paternity. 
3. The evidence proffered, but excluded by the 
trial court, was sufficient to rebut the presumption of 
legitimacy and its exclusion was sufficiently prejudicial 
to warrant rehearing in the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R O B E R T D. MAACK 
W A T K I S S & C A M P B E L L 
Attorney for Third-Party 
Defendant-Appellant and 
Petitioner 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
THE PETITION IS 
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT 
This Petition is not filed for the purpose of reargu-
ing matters originally presented. I t is intended to bring 
to the Court's attention an error in its conclusions and 
a failure to consider material points in the case. This 
is within the scope of criteria established by this Court 
; • - , , 2 i y ' ! • • - • • ; 
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for the granting of rehearing in Venardv. Old Hickory 
4 Utah 67, 7 Pac. 408 (1885). 
P O I N T I 
T H E T R I A L COURT W A S W I T H O U T 
J U R I S D I C T I O N AT T H E T I M E OF H E A R -
I N G A N D I T S O R D E R M O D I F Y I N G T H E 
DIVORCE D E C R E E IS A N U L L I T Y . 
1. The parties may not confer jurisdiction upon the 
court. 
In its opinion in Miller v. Miller <| Marticorena, 
Case No. 13629, dated January 30, 1975, the Court 
stated: 
After the death of Sheryl Rae, the child 
Michael Wayne Miller remained in the custody 
of Martincorena. Richard W. Miller, the Plain-
tiff obtained an Order to Show Cause, which was 
served upon Marticoinena for the purpose of 
contesting Marticorena's right to maintain cus-
tody of the child. While this procedure is ques-
tionable, no question was raised by the parties, 
and they elected to try out the issues of child 
custody on the issues joined by the pleadings. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
I t is indeed true that no jurisdictional question was 
raised by the parties. Miller obviously consented to this 
procedure as it was he who chose the foriim and pro-
3 
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cedure in seeking his remedy; likewise, Marticorena did 
not challenge the jurisdiction of the District Court be-
low. Although the jurisdictional issue was not initially 
raised on appeal, the Court per Mr. Justice Tuckett did 
raise the issue sua sponte at the time of oral argument 
and addressed itself to the jurisdiction issue in its writ-
ten opinion (cited supra). 
I t is clear then that the Court did consider and pass 
upon the jurisdictional aspect of the case. I t is in this 
consideration that the Appellant raises his first claim of 
error on the part of the reviewing Court that being: 
T H A T T H E P A R T I E S M A Y NOT C O N F E R 
S U B J E C T M A T T E R J U R I S D I C T I O N U P O N 
T H E COURT BY S T I P U L A T I O N OR WAIV-
E R W H E R E N O N E O T H E R W I S E E X I T S . 
Conant et al. v. Deep Creek $ Curlew Val. Irr. Co., 23 
Utah 627, 66 Pac. 188 (1901). 
2. The general rule of law is clear that upon the 
death of a party to a divorce action, the action abates 
and the Court is without jurisdiction to further modify 
the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court, particu-
larly with respect to child custody.1 
i Father's appearance in divorce court to defend against ex 
parte intervention and modification orders after death of mother 
to whom divorce court had awarded custody of children, did not 
confer or revive jurisdiction in such proceeding. State ex. rel. 
Gregory v. Superior Court of Marion County, 176 NE2d 126 (Ind 
1961). 
"The theory is that the divorce action abates upon the death 
of either spouse so that the power of the divorce court over the 
custody of the child or children once and for all completely term-
inates." Shepler v. Shepler, 348 SW2d 607 (Mo App 1961). 
4 
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Woodford v. Superior Court, 82 Ariz 181, 309 
P2d 973 (Ariz. 1957). State ex rel. Gregory vy Sup-
erior Court of Marion County, 176 N E 2d 126 (Ind. 
1961). Parks v. Parks, 135 N W 2d 625 (Iowa 1965). 
Baram v. Schwartz, 151 Gonn 315, 197 A2d 334 (R.I. 
1964). Thrash v. Cochran, 360 SW 2d 587 (Tex. 1962). 
Leclerc v. Leclerc, 85 N H 121, 155 A 249, 74 A L R 
1348 (1931). Hughes v. Bowen, 193 Okla 269,143 P2d 
139 (1943). Re Adoption of Abelsen, 190 or 319, 224 
P2d 213, 225 P2d 768 (1950). Ex parte Cahill, 286 
SW2d 210 (1955). Re Be Leon 70 Cal App 1, 232 P 
738 (1924). Girtman v. Girtman, 191 Ga 173, 11 SE2d 
782 (1940). Chapin v. Cummings, 191 Ga 408, 12 
SE2d 312 (1940). Re Smith 158 I W 578 (Iowa, 
1916). Stone v. Duffy, 219 Mass 178, 106 N E 595 
(1914). Barry v. Sparks, 306 Mass 80, 27 NE2d, 728, 
128 A L R "983 (1940). Kienlen v. Kienlen, 227 Minn 
137, 34 NW2d 351 (1948). State ex rel Gravelle v. 
Rensch, 230 Minn 160, 40 NW2d 881 (1950). Hayes 
V. Hayes, 363 Mo 583, 252 SW2d 323 (1952) (saying, 
in effect, that the jurisdiction of the divorce court con-
tinues only during the lives of both the parents). State 
ex. rel. Walker v. Crouse, 240 Mo App 389, 205 SW2d 
749 (1947). Schumacher v. Schumacher, 223 SW2d 
841, both infra (Mo App 1949). Leclerc v. Leclerc, 85 
N H 121,155 A 249, 74 A L R 1348 (1931). Re Robin-
son, 17 Abb Pr 399 (1859). Re De Saulles 101 Misc 
447, 167 NYS 445 (1917) (declaring that in the death 
of the father "all matters of status of the parties and 
their infant ceased to be affected by the decree of divorce 
5 
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and were remitted to the common law"). Bice v. And-
rews, 127 Misc 826, 217 NYS 528 (1926) (holding 
that the application to modify the divorce decree as to 
custody, after the death of the father, came too late). 
Weiss v. Fite, 19 Ohio App 309, (1924). Be Biggies 
Estate, 18 Ohio Ops 179, 32 Ohio L Abs 155 (Prob 
1940) (declaring in effect that "the jurisdiction" of 
the divorce court, in the divorce suit to award custody 
of children of the parties terminates with the death of 
either party). Hughes v. Bowen, 139 Okla 269, 163 
P2d 139 (1943). Mowrey v. Smith, 105 A2d 815 (R.I. 
1954). Sassv. Sms, 246 Wis 272,16 NW2d 829 (1944). 
Wilson v. Mitchell, 48 Colo. 454, 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 
507 111 Pac. 21 (1910). Taylor v. Jeter, 33 Ga. 195, 
81 Am. Dec. 202 (1862). Davis v. Willis, 169 La. 13, 
124 So. 129 (1929). Stone v. Duffy, 219 Mass. 178, 
106 N.E. 595 (1914). Re Blackburn, 41 Mo. App. 622 
(1890). Be Steele, 107 Mo. App. 567, 81 S.W. 1182 
(1904). Clark v. Lyon, 82 Neb. 625, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 
171,118 N.W. 472 (1908). Be Peterson, 119 Neb. 511, 
229 N.W. 885 (1930). Be Bobinson, 17 Abb. Pr. 399 
(1859). Be De Saulles, 101 Misc. 477, 167 N.Y. Supp. 
445 (1917). Bryant v. Dukehart, 106 Or. 359, 210 Pac. 
454 (1922). Ellenburg v. Woodson, 131 Or. 440, 283 
Pac. 27 (1929). Be Neff, 20 Wash. 652, 56 Pac. 383 
(1899). 
Although no Utah case specifically on point is ap-
parently extant, the case of Farmer v. Christensen, 55 
Utah 1, 183 Pac. 328 (1919) by way of dicta indicates 
that the correct proceeding to determine child custody 
6 
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after the death of the custodial parent is by means of a 
petition for Habeas Corpus. 
Although a plethora of Utah case authority exists 
wherein a party has died before a Divorce DecreeAbe-
come final and the Utah Supreme Court has taken dif-
fering positions with respect to the affect of a party's 
death upon the property disposition made by an inter-
locutory decree, no Utah case can be found involving 
an attempt at modifying the child custody provision 
(as opposed to a property disposition) of a Divorce 
Decree after the Divorce Decree has become final. The 
ajbove cited case of Farmer v. Christensen, strongly sug-
gests that the Utah Rule is in accord with the rule an-
nounced in the cases from other states also cited above. 
A good statement of the reasoning and law an-
nounced in those cases is exemplified in Woodford v. 
Superior Court, 82 Ariz. 181, 309 P.2d 973 (1957). In 
that case the Court held: 
The only question presented is whether the Su-
perior Court of Graham County had jurisdiction 
to modify the divorce decree, transferring the 
legal custody of the minor children to the sur-
vivor after the death of one of the parties to the 
divorce action. 
. . . But the question before us in the instant 
case is not the fact of such continuing jurisdiction 
but rather whether it continues after the death of 
one of the parties. On this issue we find the pre-
7 
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vailing and better-reasoned rule to be that the 
death of one of the parties divorced by a judicial 
decree terminates the continuing power of the 
court to modify the decree with respect to the 
custody of the children involved. 27 C.J.S., 
Divorce, §314; Brown v. Brown, 218 Ark. 624, 
238 S.W. 2d 482; see also Annotation, Death of 
Custodian of Child, 74 A.L.R. 1352; 39 A.L.R. 
2d 260, 278. This rule prevails in jurisdictions 
having provisions similar to ours for continuing 
jurisdiction to amend the decree relative to cus-
tody. In re Be Leon, 1924, 70 Cal. App. 1, 232 
P . 738. We cited this case with approval in 
Grimditch v. Grimditch, supra. Such continuing 
jurisdiction on the custody matter becomes clear-
ly unnecessary when it is considered in the light 
of the well-settled proposition that, upon the 
death of a party who holds legal custody pur-
suant to a divorce decree, the right of legal cus-
tody automatically inures to the surviving parent. 
In re Frank, 41 Wash. 2d 294, 248 P.2d 553; 
Roily v. Smith, 202 Ga. 185, 42 S.E. 2d 491; 
Annotation, 74 A.L.R., 1352, supra. The legal 
custody so derived continues until it is shown that 
such survivor is unfit to assume the responibilities 
inherent to parenthood. The reasoning upon 
which this rule is founded is clearly pronounced 
in the textual material appearing at 128 A.L.R. 
990, . . . 
I t is submitted that the Rule of Law is that when 
a Divorce Decree has become final and a party to 
divorce thereafter dies, the divorce action abates and 
the divorce court no longer has subject matter jurisdic-
8 
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tion to modify the decree. Consequently, the final order 
of the trial court modifying the decree is a nullity. 
P O I N T I I 
I N I T S O P I N I O N T H E COURT D I D NOT 
C O N S I D E R P H Y S I C A L CIRCUMSTANCES 
A N D M E D I C A L E V I D E N C E T H A T W A S 
A B S O L U T E L Y R E L I A B L E A N D D E T E R M -
I N A T I V E O F P A T E R N I T Y . 
In the Court's opinion in the case at bar it stated: 
"The main thrust of Marticorena's appeal to 
this Court is based upon refusal of the Trial 
Court to admit certain statements made by 
Sheryl Rae to Marticorena, Dr. Donald, Dr. 
Kirk, the physician who attended Sheryl Rae 
prior to and at the birth of the child; Dr. Kirk's 
nurse and a Bishop of the L.D.S. Church. While 
the specific grounds for the refusal on the part 
of the Court do not appear, it would appear that 
the ruling was based upon the Court's judgment 
that a proper foundation had not been laid for 
the receipt of the proffered testimony." 
It is submitted that the main thrust of the appeal 
was that the Court refused to admit testimony of Dr. 
Donald, . Kirk with respect to the date when he first 
determined the pregnancy of the deceased mother and 
when conception occurred. 
9 
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These medical facts are based upon actual ob-
servation and in no way relate to the credibility or re-
liability of statements made. The proffered testimony 
of various other individuals (i.e., Dr. Kirk's Nurse) 
was merely to corroborate the physician's testimony. 
Beginning at page 9 of A P P E L L A N T ' S B R I E F 
P O I N T I I (1.), the Appellant urged that the Trial 
Court errored in excluding medical facts. The transcript 
shows a proffer of proof at pages 125 through 127 
where appellant's counsel attempted to introduce evi-
dence that Dr. Kirk determined that Sheryl Rae was 
pregnant on Aug. 16, 1969 one full week before Miller 
came to California from his tour of active duty in 
Georgia. 
Moreover, Appellant's Brief (p. 11) and Trans-
cript (p. 126) clearly show that the Trial Court spec-
ifically held these medical facts to be inadmissible on 
the grounds of: 
(1.) Hearsay. 
(2.) Being inconsistent with prior divorce decree; 
and 
(3.) as being self-serving. 
Be ply: 1. These medical facts are physical evi-
dence and not testimonial in nature and cannot be hear-
say. 
10 
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2. Marticorena cannot be collaterally estopped by 
findings in an action to which he was never a party. 
Almeida v. Correa, 51 Hawaii 594,565 P.2d 564 (1970). 
3. Dr. Kirk's medical findings cannot conceivably 
be self-serving to him as he has no interest in the out-
come of the litigation. 
The Court on review failed to consider the main 
thrust of the appeal that of medical facts and the date 
of conception and pregnancy. 
P O I N T I I I 
T H E E V I D E N C E P R O F F E R E D , B U T E X -
C L U D E D BY T H E T R I A L COURT W A S SUF-
F I C I E N T TO R E B U T T H E P R E S U M P T I O N 
O F L E G I T I M A C Y A N D I T S E X C L U S I O N 
W A S S U F F I C I E N T L Y P R E J U D I C I A L TO 
W A R R A N T R E H E A R I N G I N T H E T R I A L 
COURT. 
The Court in the Miller v. Miller § Marticorena 
opinion stated: 
"The evidence shows that on or about the time 
of her conception, Sheryl Rae had sex relations 
with both Marticorena and Richard. I t is un-
likely that she knew which man was in fact the 
father . . . under these circumstances the Court 
was correct in its ruling." 
II 
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Since the Court found Miller came to California 
in the third week in August, (see opinion) it is vitally 
important to allow testimony from the doctor definitely 
establishing her pregnancy during the second week in 
August, one full week before Miller came to California. 
Under these circumstances, the testimony as to the date 
of pregnancy was not only important, it was determin-
ative. In a like circumstance the Georgia Court held: 
Where a husband and wife reside at a distance 
from each other, so as to exclude the possibility 
of sexual intercourse, there it is admitted that 
the presumption of legitimacy is at once re-
butted. Wright v. Hicks, 12 Ga. 1551, 56 Am 
Dec. 451. 
CONCLUSION 
The parties cannot confer jurisdiction upon the 
Court, and the Trial Court was without jurisdiction to 
modify the Divorce Decree with respect to child cus-
tody. Consequently, the order of the Trial Court is a 
nullity. The Appellate Court overlooked the exclusion 
by the Trial Court of medical evidence that would have 
been determinative of the entire issue of paternity. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Robert D. Maack 
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